Friday, January 21, 2011

Can the revolution in Tunisia be harbinger of change in other Arab countries like Egypt?

Tunisian dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled Tunisia earlier this month after a series of violent riots throughout the country evolved into anti-government protests. The two questions on everybody’s minds are: What type of government will come to power in Tunisia? And does Tunisia serve as a model for other Arab authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt?


As someone unfamiliar with the political situation in Tunisia, I can comment very little on the future Tunisian regime; however, I disagree with Michael Koplow's article, Tunisia's Revolution Is Islamist-Free, which suggests 1) that Tunisia's Islamist movement is weak and 2) that this fact distinguishes Tunisia from its other Arab neighbors. Although Tunisian society has been described by many as more liberal than, for example, Egyptian society, Koplow makes a number of statements in his article that are misleading about the political situation both in Tunisia and in the other Arab countries. First, Tunisia is not the only Arab country with an opposition consisting of "secular intellectuals, lawyers, and trade unionists." Although the Muslim Brotherhood is the most visible opposition group in Egypt, there is also a bloc of secular Egyptian activists active in the political sphere, exemplified most recently by Mohammed ElBaradei and his supporters.


Second, the statement that "the Tunisian government is rooted in secular Arab nationalist ideology and has long taken its secularism and its nationalism more seriously than its neighbors" ignores the long history of secular Arab nationalist ideology that that initially spread in the region at the hands of the Egyptian, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and fails to explain what actions qualify as 'taking Arab nationalism seriously'. Throughout modern Middle Eastern history, different Arab leaders have raised the banner of Arab nationalism to realize their specific political goals. Is 'seriousness' then measured by the degree of repression? If so, then wouldn't the Syrian regime's actions in Hama in 1982 show an unwavering dedication to a secular nationalist agenda?


Further, Koplow's statement that "the absence of a strong Islamist presence is the result of an aggressive attempt by successive Tunisian regimes, dating back over a half-century, to eliminate Islamists from public life" is predicated on the false assumption that Islamists in exile do not matter. This, as we have seen over the last two weeks, is clearly untrue. Since the overthrow of Ben Ali, many Islamists have returned to Tunisia and rapidly established the credibility of Rachid Ghannouchi's Islamist party. Additionally, this view supports those who believe the only way to deal with Islamists is through coercion. However, it has become evident over the last few years that beating Islamists away with a stick is an easy way to ensure their future credibility as the primary opposition group should the regime ever falter or, heaven forbid, fall. Consequently, the Tunisian Islamist party is a real player in the changing political arena in Tunisia and the United States and other countries should engage the party in political talks accordingly.


Regarding how the situation in Tunisia differs from other Arab countries, the most important factors appear to be population size, level of education and economic development and last, but certainly not least, the relationship between the regime and the military (see here for more on the role of the military), rather than the size and domestic presence of the Islamist movement. For example, while Tunisia's military is no longer reliant on the patronage networks of the regime for its institutional identity and survival, the military in Egypt remains strongly tied to Mubarak's regime and its political agenda. This could change if Gamal Mubarak succeeds his father in the coming years, especially if businessmen begin to possess a heavier hand in Egyptian politics. While that is some time off in the future for Egypt, the role of the Tunisian military over the next few months is an important and uncertain element of Tunisia's political transition. The military's actions over the coming period of political bargaining will be significant in shaping the future Tunisian regime (whatever it may be...).



Links to other articles/reports on Tunisia:

Ben Ali may be gone but his constitution is not yet forgotten

No sign Egypt will take the Tunisian road

Youtube Video from Egyptian TV show discussing the unrest in Tunisia (in Arabic)

Tunisia: banned political parties are recognized, political prisoners are released (in Arabic)

The post-American Middle East

Interesting article on the declining role of the US in the Middle East. Or as the author puts it: the post-American Middle East.

Monday, November 29, 2010

2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections

sign supporting Mohammed Beltagy (MB candidate) in Shubra


sign supporting Megahed Nasar (NDP candidate) in Shubra


police outside of polling station in Zamalek


car with posters supporting Hisham Mustafa Khalil (NDP candidate) outside of a polling station in Zamalek


poster supporting Gamila Ismael in the Qasr al-Nil constituency


poster announcing Seuodi Market's support for NDP candidate, Hisham Mustafa Khalil


poster for al-Ghad Party candidate in Abdeen


Election day in Egypt passed without much excitement.

Above are a few photos I took in the Downtown/Zamalek/Shubra areas on election day. Most polling stations seemed empty and their entrances were heavily guarded by police. I heard from one CASA professor that he was turned away at the polling station. There were also rumors of the regime setting up "polling stations" on the government employee buses so that government employees could "cast their votes" on buses.

There were reports of fairly vicious electoral competition between Mohammed Beltagy and Megahed Nasar in Shubra on election day, but even those polling stations seemed dead by the afternoon.

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

القصة تتكرر: اباء الحكومة المصرية لوجود المراقبين الدوليين إبان الانتخابات المقبلة

في غضون الأسابيع الماضية، رفضت الحكومة المصرية دعوة الرئيس الأمريكي باراك أوباما لقبول وجود مراقبي الانتخابات الدوليين بزعم أن مواطني مصر لا يريدونه نظرا لأن وجود مراقبين دوليين يمثل تحديا لسيادة الدولة. وأعلنت الحكومة المصرية أن مؤسساتها وقوانينها ودستورها تكفي لتضمن نزاهة وشفافية الانتخابات المقبلة لمجلس الشعب التي سوف تجري في ٢٨ من الشهر الجاري والانتخابات لرئاسة مصر التي سوف تجري في العام القادم.

ولكن إذا نلفت النظر إلى تاريخ مراقبة الانتخابات، لا يمكن أحد الزعم بأن وجود المراقبين يهدد سيادة الدولة. فتقوم مؤسسات متعددة بمراقبة الانتخابات منها مؤسسات ليس لها علاقة ببلد معين أو بأجندة سياسية معينة مثل مؤسسة الرئيس السابق كارتر. وتتم مراقبة الانتخابات في دول كثيرة ما بين بوليفيا وسيراليون. وفي الاعوام الأخيرة وصل التعاون بين المؤسسات المحلية والأنظمة الدولية في ما يخص معايير الانتخابات وتدريب المراقبين إلى درجة أننا لا نستطيع أن نقول إن عملية مراقبة الانتخابات عملية تأتي من الخارج فقط، بل لا بد أن نعترف بأن مراقبة الانتخابات لها تأييد ودعم من كثير من المصريين .

وأكثر من ذلك، لا يشير تاريخ الانتخابات في مصر إلى التزام الحكومة وأعضائها المختلفة بمبادئ الشفافية والنزاهة والاستقامة. فلا يمكن الانكار أن كل الانتخابات التي تمت خلال العقود الأخيرة عانت من التزوير والفساد وعدم الحريات الأساسية لإجراء الانتخابات. قد رفضت الحكومة المصرية الاعتراف ببعض الأحزاب المعارضة واعتقلت بعض قياد المعارضة وبعض أعضاء الأحزاب المعارضة بغض النظر عن وجود جرائم حقيقية إلا اعتراضهم على هيمنة الحزب الوطني الديموقراطي الذي سيطر على حكومة مصر منذ تأسيسه على يد السادات في عام ١٩٧٨. ونرى أن في هذا العام معظم مرشحي الانتخابات ينتمون إلى الحزب الوطني وفي بعض الدوائر الانتخابية مرشحو الحزب الوطني ينافسون أنفسهم فقط. هل نستطيع أن نسمي هذا منافسة حقيقية ومفتوحة للكل؟ أليس علينا أن نميز بين المنافسة الحقيقية وعبث المنافسة الذي يحدث الآن في مصر؟

ولا تقف المشاكل التي تواجهها مصر أثناء الانتخابات على التزوير والفساد وحسب، بل يواجه مصريون كثيرون تهديد العنف في أماكن قريبة من مكاتب التصويت لاسيما في المناطق فيها منافسة شديدة بين مرشح الحزب الوطني ومرشح المعارضة. وأضافة إلى ذلك، تواجه وكالات الأنباء تجديد القمع لنشر معلومات ورقابة صارمة ناهيك عن اعتقال بعض الصحافيين ومدونين المشهورين وإغلاق بعض مكاتب الصحف إطلاقا. كما أن بالرغم من وجود صحف محايدة أو صحف معارضة، فإن معظم وكالات الأبناء المصرية لم تزل تنتمي إلى الحكومة والحزب الوطني.

وإذا أردنا أن نرى تغيرات لهذا النظام الانتخابي، علينا أن نضيف أصواتنا إلى صوت الرئيس أباما ونطالب بوجود مراقبي الانتخابات الدوليين في مصر

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

Five Days...

In preparation for the Egyptian parliamentary elections that are now only five days away, I am posting a link to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Egyptian elections guide. There is a ton of information on the site about the majors players and major obstacles. The Egyptian government's recent refusal to allow international observers to observe these elections is disappointing, although certainly not surprising. Election observation can have an tangible effect in terms of streamlining the complaint system and offering constructive criticism to the government with regard to voter registration, polling station protocol and campaign laws. Improvement in each of these areas (among many others) represents an important step in strengthening any nascent democracy.

In other news, Egyptian blogger Abdul Kareem Nabil Soliman was recently released from prison after a five year sentence for insulting Mubarak (calling him a dictator) and al-Azhar.